Isha Lodha, Sanjeesha Agarwal
ABSTRACT
Administrative discretion is an unregulated unilateral conduct that is not protected by the safeguards implicit in the constructed framework. Administrative discretion issues are complicated. It is indisputable that under any intense governmental system, authorities must use certain discretion in order for the administration to work. However, it is also undeniable that total discretion is a false idol. It is profoundly detrimental to liberty than any other human innovation. It might be deduced that use of discretionary authority by administrative agencies is critical for the performance of their tasks, but this discretionary authority must not be extraneous and unregulated. It must be constrained by some reasonableness such that it does not become indiscriminate and, as a result, contradict the administration agency's acts. Such authority can be managed either at the time of administrative power conferment or at the time of execution of such authority. The purpose of this study is to critically examine the concept of Administrative Discretion and the limitations on the use of administrative power at the stage of power conferment. It analyses how constraints on the exercise of administrative authority are required, as well as how such power might be managed and restrained. In addition, the authors make proposals for striking a suitable balance between administrative discretion and its limitations.
Keywords: Administrative discretion, Reasonability, Fundamental rights, Judicial review, Limitations
1. INTRODUCTION
Administrative decisions can be categorised as ministerial or discretionary in nature[1]. A ministerial role is one in which the administration has an obligation to perform something in a certain way. Such activities, however, are rare. Majorly in all administrative activities, the bureaucratic agency has the authority to act or not act in one way or another. Discretionary power refers to the ability to act or not act in one manner or another.[2]
Administrative discretion allows for creativity in administrative areas as well as public authority acts.[3] In most circumstances, discretion is granted by the legislator in order to accomplish a certain goal. However, the rise of authority is seen with mistrust as a promoter of arbitrary nature. It is the intersection between discretion and the concepts of limitations, scrutiny, and responsibility.
A common current practice in modern democracies is to delegate a considerable discretion to administrative bodies. The majority of the abilities presently bestowed are deployable at the discretion of the concerned authority. In most situations, legislation imposing responsibilities upon the Executive is rather vaguely written and does not state plainly and unequivocally the situations and occasions under which, and the standards with regard to which, the Executive is to employ the authorities bestowed on it[4]. This is a concerning phenomenon since when the Executive is given total authority, judicial control erodes.
This paper seeks to analyse the concept of Administrative Discretion and the limitation on the exercise of administrative power at the stage of conferment of power. It examines why limitations on the exercise of the administrative power is necessary and what are the methods by such power can be controlled and limited. The authors also provide recommendations to strike a reasonable balance between administrative discretion and its limitations.
2. MEANING
Administrative discretion is selecting among existing possibilities based on norms of reason and fairness rather than a person's own preferences and likes. This practice should not be ambiguous, distorted, or whimsical, but rather lawful and consistent.[5] Administrative discretion is an unregulated unilateral conduct that is not protected by the safeguards implicit in the constructed framework.[6]
The West Encyclopedia of American Law has defined Administrative Discretion as “The exercise of professional expertise and judgment, as opposed to strict adherence to regulations or statutes, in making a decision or performing official acts or duties. It is something informal and therefore unprotected by safeguards inherent in formal procedures. It is a freedom to make a choice among potential course of action.”[7]
One of the most widely accepted definitions of 'administrative discretion' is given by Professor Freund in the following words: 'When we speak of administrative discretion, we mean that a determination may be reached, in part at least, upon the basis of consideration not entirely susceptible of proof or disproof.... It may be practically convenient to say that discretion includes the case in which the ascertainment of fact is legitimately left to administrative determination.”[8]
Prof Julius Grey in his book ‘Discretion in Administrative Law’ has defined it as “it is a power to make a decision that cannot be determined to be right or wrong in any objective way.”[9]
Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education & Science v. Tameride Metroborough Council[10] has defined it as “the very concept of Administrative Discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible courses of action upon which there is a room for reasonable people to hold differing opinion as to what may be preferred.”
3. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The concept of administrative discretion may be traced back to the time of the well-known Greek philosopher Socrates, who was attempting to create the groundwork for philosophical ethics. Socrates devised a broad classification of "universal morals" in an attempt to put altogether a standard that may be used to decide the best path of conduct to adopt in every given scenario.[11] He gave value ordering along with specific "means to ends" which will identify morally philosophical generalization choices[12] .
In this setting, the range of reasonableness is fairly broad and diversified. The lawful notion of reasonableness was substantially developed in the UK, initially appearing in Rooke's case[13] in 1598 and subsequently clarified in the Wednesbury judgment[14] in 1948, from which it became widely renowned and was accepted in the common law systems of numerous nations globally.
3.1. Doctrine of reasonableness in Administrative discretion
3.1.1. Irrationality and Wednesbury Unreasonableness
Lord Diplock created the idea of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" in the case of Associated Picture House v. Wednesbury Corporation[15], where he compared it along with irrationality[16]. It merely indicates that administrative discretion should be used in a prudent manner. As a result, an individual delegated with discretion must exercise good legal judgement. He should draw his awareness to issues that he is obligated to examine. He should reject from his attention any issues that are unrelated to the topic at hand. If somebody does not follow the rules, he is considered to be being unreasonable[17].
Lord Diplock defines "wednesbury unreasonableness" as "a concept which pertains to a conclusion which is so absurd in its rejection of reason or established ethical norms that almost no logical individual who dedicated his intellect to the subject at hand would reach at it."[18] Clearly, the idea of Wednesbury unreasonableness is exceedingly ambiguous and incapable of scientific appraisal. As a result, Wednesbury unreasonableness cannot be described in terms of universally applicable testing methods.
The doctrine of reasonability in administrative discretion stipulates that there should be a plausible relationship seen between anticipated outcome and the procedures chosen to achieve that outcome. As a result, the act taken should not be grossly unequal to the court's awareness, and the conduct also can be contested through judicial review[19]. This requirement for rationality and how it aids in the configuration and evaluation of legislation has resulted in the development of the notion of reasonableness in administrative law[20].
In administrative law, the doctrine of reasonableness is often used as a substantial norm to assess the subject matter and substance of bureaucratic activity, providing instructions to government authorities in administrative tasks. Each and every action made by the government might be regarded irrational if it does not objectively reflect all of the legal and practically applicable aspects. Individuals assume and depend on governmental activities and legislation because they adhere to rationality.
3.2. Doctrine of Reasonableness: As a standard for legitimacy
The foremost contention for the reasonability of any legislation or regulation enacted by the administration is its legitimacy. Legitimacy implies compliance with laws and standards that could be justified logically.[21] Law's reasoning is founded on logic, and every law or regulation that is supported by correct reason has minimal issues and a higher percentage of acceptance and adherence. As a result, legitimacy is asserted via reasonability.
3.3. Doctrine of Reasonableness: As a standard for Statutory Interpretation
The goal of every statutory interpretation seems to obtain a reasonable understanding of the legislation. Compliance to reasonableness is accomplished by maintaining a close eye on two variables viz avoiding unreasonable or ludicrous consequences and contextual reasoning[22]. It is well known that the assumption underlying law creation is not to consider leaving them open to dubious inference.
Contextual reasoning refers to in what way the legislation is written and what it implies[23]. When engaging with contextual reasoning, there are two components of law - making powers that must be comprehended: activist law making and dynamic law making.[24] When a previously existing or community driven proposal is picked up and transformed into legislation, this is referred to as activist law making. Dynamic law making entails the establishment of a notion on which public agreement has not yet been attained, which is subsequently transformed into a statute and spread. In both cases, the phrase reasonable is critical. Legislators and legal scholars utilize reasonableness as a measure for drafting, enforcing, and applying laws.
3.4. Doctrine of Reasonableness: As a standard for Judicial Review
The doctrine of reasonableness is particularly significant and relevant in the framework of Judicial Review. Since this is the subject of the analysis, administrative actions can be nullified if they are found irrational. Administrative action has been allowed unlimited independence on one side, but its choices are evaluated on the merits of the judgment on the other.
How much authority may the court exert in the guise of reasonability is a critical subject, and it's been proposed as a solution that administrative independence and discretion are permitted and must not be removed unduly when implementing rationality[25]. In the judgment of Wednesbury Corporation, Lord Greene M.R. held that the judiciary will not intervene in the decision of administrative authorities, provided that:-
The authorities have taken account of all the necessary things which it should have taken.
The authorities did not take into account the things which it should not have taken.
The decision is not unreasonable (something which no reasonable authority will take).
Following the court's judgment, we can allude to an interpretation of reasonableness in two aspects: narrow, which examines the aforementioned direction that no rational body may undertake such an activity, and broad, which analyses all the aforementioned directions issued in that instance.
It is deemed important to take into account and pursue the broader interpretation of reasonableness since it can accomplish two purposes in administrative review viz it can establish the extent for government authority's expertise and, if the authority is skilled sufficiently, it can delegate its discretion.
4. DISCRETION INEVITABLE
The government cannot function without the administrative authorities being given discretionary powers. The following factors can be cited for the increase of discretionary power being given, like the government's welfare concept and the adoption of other development initiatives, mechanisms for environmental control, a lack of technical competence on the side of the legislation, as well as a demand for professional counsel, and any unforeseen circumstances. The administrative authorities face a wide range of issues due to the complexity of the subject matter, for which deploying discretion becomes necessary.
Administrative discretion is unavoidable for the reasons outlined above and because it is used to achieve specific goals. These functions can be broadly classified as follows:
When enacting a law, lawmakers leave some gaps and ambiguities in the legislation. On a case-by-case basis, administrative powers will be used to fill in the gaps and uncertainties.
Determination of people's rights and interests, which is subject to the authorities' discretion.
Using administrative discretion, the policy objectives are hoped to be broadened.
Discretion is employed while dealing with unforeseen circumstances.
It is used to deal with issues that require technical expertise, as personnel in a technical department are better equipped to deal with such issues than legislators.
In his classic treatise on constitutional law[26], Dicey criticized such discretionary power. Discretion, according to Dicey, was the basis of inequity, prejudice, and arbitrary conduct. As a result, it was a violation of the rule of law. According to Dicey, the rule of law ensured total predictability of administrative action[27].
5. DISCRETION AND LEGALITY
The efficient exercise of discretionary power in accordance with and within the bounds of the law that vests it is critical to administrative law authorities. The conferment of it has increased as the state's tasks have expanded and gotten more complex. The courts face a difficult problem in providing administrative authorities greatest freedom but still allowing them to carry out the act's aim without acting arbitrarily.
The Judicial Review System has grown in tandem with the state's increasingly complicated regulatory tasks. In the Wednusbury case[28], the English courts abandoned the judicial restrictions of the war[29] and post-war[30] years and established the standard to be fulfilled for the exercise of discretionary power, as well as the proportionality test that came in through the door of the European Convention on Human Rights[31].
The Indian courts have taken a similar path, with the exception that, due to constitutional provisions, the proportionality test is a part of the Indian system. An administrative action is subject to scrutiny at both the stage of awarding discretionary power and the stage of exercising discretion. Articles 14[32] and 16[33] of the Constitution function as discretionary authority regulators at the moment of conferral. If an act of the legislature or the administration goes beyond the limits of the constitution, it is not constitutionally valid[34].
6. LIMITATION IMPOSED AT THE STAGE OF CONFERMENT OF DISCRETIONARY POWER
There is a need to check or limit such a discretionary power when the legislature writes a law in such a way that it is more likely to be abused, that is, if the legislation may be conveniently misused or exploited and the rights and interests of the people are compromised. As a result, in such instances, Article 14[35] and Article 19[36] of the constitution serve as check and balances on such power grants.
Administrative discretion can be challenged on the grounds that it violates constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. Administrative discretion, for example, can be used to treat different people differently without justification, or to render major freedoms of association, speech, and expression reliant on the good will of the administrative authorities. If the power granted is unchecked and there is a risk of discrimination, the law granting the discretion may be found unlawful for violating the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution by virtue of articles 14[37] and 19[38] of the Constitution, and such a law will be deemed to be an unreasonable restriction on those rights[39].
6.1. Limitation on Grant of Discretionary Power vis-à-vis Article 14-
The conferral of discretionary powers is subject to several limitations under Article 14[40] of the Indian Constitution. It guarantees citizens of India the fundamental rights of equality before the law and equal protection under the law. Any law that discriminates between people or groups of people is unconstitutional. When it comes to determining the validity of administrative authorities' discretionary powers, a similar approach has been used.
The Supreme Court highlighted the above-mentioned point in Ram Krishna v Justice Tendulkar[41], holding that the Court would look to see if the act contained any policies or principles for directing the government's exercise of discretion in matters of selection or categorization, and if it didn't, the statute would be struck down because it gave the government arbitrary and uncontrolled power.In another instance, The Passports Act, 1967 was in dispute Satwant Singh v Assistant Passport Officer[42]. The act was ruled to be unconstitutional because it gave the passport officer the discretion to grant or deny a passport without defining the scope of that power. The court urged Parliament to establish guidelines on how the passport officer should exercise his discretion.
In Re The Special Courts Bill 1978[43], The Supreme Court upheld the special courts bill, which created special tribunals to investigate crimes committed by those in high political positions during Indira Gandhi's 1975 emergency. The bill gave the government the power to refer these cases to special courts. The discretionary grant was upheld by the Court because it was governed by the Act's policy. The provision of authority to send any case involving abuse of power to special courts during the emergency period was valid, according to the Court, and it constituted a class of cases.The Court decided in R Patnakar Rao v Andhra Pradesh[44], that if there are built-in constraints against its misuse, such as:
1. If the power is given to a senior official or authority;
2. If there are regulations mandating that administrative discretion be preceded by a quasi-judicial inquiry,
Then the discretion is not unguided, unanalyzed, or arbitrary.
6.1.1. Discretion Given to a High Official
The Supreme Court upheld a provision of discretion to the CAG granted by Section 7(2) of the India Audit and Accounts Departments (Subordinate Accounts and Subordinate Railway Audit Services) Service Rules 1974 in the matter of Accountant General v S Doraiswamy[45]. The CAG was viewed as a high-ranking constitutional authority who should act in accordance with the needs of the service and not arbitrarily. Furthermore, there was an assumption that public officials would carry out their responsibilities honestly and in line with the law[46].
6.1.2. Power to be Exercised By a Quasi- Judicial Authority-
In the case of Digambar v Pune Municipal Corporation[47], The power granted to the government under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, to cancel or alter a license issued was determined to be not unguided because it could only be exercised after the person affected was given an opportunity to be heard. As there were no grounds for appeal, the challenged statute could not be deemed unconstitutional.
6.2. Limitation on Grant of Discretionary Power vis-à-vis Article 19-
Article 19[48] of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression, as well as a host of other rights. When a person uses this right, others are obligated not to infringe on or limit those rights. As a result, any discretionary power granted to the government that hinders or restricts citizens' fundamental rights is ruled null and void. As a result, Art 19 operates as a check on the exercise of discretionary power.
If any discretionary power is granted that violates the rights of others, that discretionary power gets invalidated. However, the state might limit the above-mentioned rights in accordance with Art 19 (2) to (6). The Court decides whether the restrictions are acceptable[49]. The premise guiding the determination of a restriction's reasonableness is that executive power provided by law should not be arbitrary and uncontrolled, and it should not be left without any check and supervision by the above authorities[50].
6.2.1. Freedom of Speech, Assembly and Expression
In PrabhakarPandurang v Maharashtra[51], a detainee sought permission from the Maharashtra government under r 39(1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 to send the manuscripts of his book, which was purely of scientific interest, out of jail to his wife for publication. The State government was found to have acted illegally by refusing to send the manuscript. In Madras v V.G. Rao[52], The Supreme Court threw down a legislation that permitted an administrative authority to declare an association unlawful based on its subjective belief that the association was engaging in subversive activity, as a violation and undue restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of association.The law did not specify the basis for establishing such limits, which may be tested in a court of law. The Court went on to say that a democracy's lifeblood is the right to associate.
6.2.2. Freedom to Acquire Property
Raghuvir v. Wards Court[53], A law that sought to deprive a person of his property for an incredible duration based simply on an Officer's subjective satisfaction was ruled to be unconstitutional. In Jagannath v Orissa[54], a law authorising the executive to frame a scheme of management and administration of an endowed property without judicial intervention at any stage was held to be invalid as an unreasonable restriction on the right to property.
6.2.3. Freedom of Business
In Uttar Pradesh v. Dwarka Prasad[55], the Supreme Court ruled that requiring a licence to stock, trade, or store for sale an important commodity like coal was not unconstitutional. Provisions granting or refusing to grant, renewing or refusing to renew, suspending, revoke, cancelling, or amending any licence without the presence of any norms, principles, or rules to control the authority were deemed unconstitutional as breaching fundamental rights. Also in the case of M/s Diwan Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. India[56], The Sugar (control) Order 1955's Sections 4 & 5, which required companies to sell sugar at a set price, was upheld. The prices set were neither arbitrary nor below the cost of production. The enabling Act was upheld as well, because it included sufficient protections against misuse of power.
7. ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
Simply expressed, the term "abuse of administrative discretion" refers to circumstances in which an administrative authority has used its discretion in an unjustified or improper manner. In such instances, the court may intervene and give the case the necessary direction.
The following are the grounds for seeking judicial review of an alleged abuse of administrative discretion:
a. An administrative authority acts in a domain over which it has no legal authority and the authority goes beyond what the legislature has granted it permission to do.
b. The authority has attempted to accomplish what it is not permitted to do directly, namely, the colourable use of power, in an indirect manner.
c. Irrelevant concerns were taken into account by the authority when making a judgement, but vital issues were ignored.
d. The authority's action is arbitrary and the authority acted in an ill-intentioned manner.
e. Failure to follow natural justice principles and Unreasonableness.
In the case of Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India[57], The Indian Express newspaper received a notification of re-entry upon forfeiture from the government. The warning was false, according to the publication, and was based on a spurious factor - the Indian Express' negative comments on the Congress government. The claims were not denied by the administration, but they were dismissed as irrelevant. The notice was invalidated because it was false, and the Court also stated that it is up to the Court to decide what is relevant and what is not. It is forbidden for the parties to discuss it.
Lastly in the case of J.K Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation[58], A Company Secretary contested the validity of an investigation into his conduct that led to his dismissal, arguing that he was denied legal representation despite the fact that the company's presenting officer was a legally qualified person, and that this was a violation of natural justice.The Supreme Court of India accepted the reasons and ruled that the investigation was handled in breach of natural justice principles since the appellant was denied legal representation, denying him a fair chance to present his case against a qualified prosecutor in the best possible way.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that, in order for the rule of law to exist in a modern welfare state, a stable balance is to be struck between the conferment of administrative discretion that the State grants to the executive and the people's fundamental rights and freedoms. It is only then can India be supposed to become the ideal democratic republic that the Indian Constitution envisions. Although the judiciary has sadly damaged the spirit of the rule of law in many instances by affirming the constitutionality of some vague clauses that, in effect, put unrestrained discretionary power on the administrative authorities, it is recommended that these ramifications be addressed and the spirit of rule of law be upheld.
The modern welfare state's framework necessitates that administrative officials be given discretionary powers to assist them in doing their duties properly. Administrative discretion creates a variety of possibilities for interaction between administrative discretion and fundamental rights, whether in conflict or convergence. However, it must be admitted that the Indian judiciary has done an outstanding job in repeatedly attempting to strike down clauses that gave administrative officials unrestricted and uncanalised power. This approach of the Supreme Court is commendable and consistent with the founders of the Indian Constitution's vision of the Indian republic.
9. CONCLUSION
Administrative discretion is an important aspect of the administrative authorities' rule-making process. It empowers them to enact rules and regulations that the legislature has failed to implement for a variety of reasons. Administrative discretion in effect is the foundation on which the administrative authorities' operations are based; without which, effective acts are impossible to be carried out. The concept of administrative discretion however, is like a double-edged sword, where on the one hand, the importance of administrative power is well understood, and administrative discretion can never be eliminated, as long as it is not arbitrary; on the other hand, this discretionary power carries the risk of the authorities exercising it being unreasonable and arbitrary, and acting against the people's interests. It even poses the risk of undermining the rule of law.
The underlying premise of discretionary power's legality is that it must be exerted on reasonable grounds and supported by justification. Any power that is exercised based on the whims and fancies of the authority, using it risks it becoming unguided, uncontrolled, and in violation of citizens' rights. As a result, any discretionary power that appears to be arbitrary and unguided should be checked at the time of conferment. Fundamental Rights under Articles 14[59] and 19[60] of the Constitution are used to accomplish this. Any rule or statute that gives authorities discretionary power and is violative of fundamental rights is null and void.
Thus, in conclusion, the modern welfare state's structure necessitates the grant of discretionary powers to administrative agencies in order for them to properly perform their tasks. Although, it is this discretion that must be granted with care, with appropriate checks and balances in place, in order to achieve the goal for which such powers were granted in the first place.
[1]Khare and Shubham Manoj, “Administrative Discretion & Limitation on Administrative Discretion By Article 14 & 16 of the Indian Constitution” , available at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=1465519 (last visited on 11 November 2021).
[2]Ibid.
[3] Marcelo Figuereido, “Administrative Discretion: A Comparative Analysis”, IACL-AIDC BLOG,available at: https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/blog/2018/5/17/administrative-discretion-a-comparative-analysis (last visited on 11 November 2021).
[4] M. PJain,“Administrative Discretion and Fundamental Rights in India”, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, vol. 1, no. 2, Indian Law Institute, 1959, pp. 223–50.
[5]Sharp v Wakefield, 1891 AC 173.
[6] Deepali Kir, “Administrative Discretion: Meaning and Grounds of Control”, LAWBHOOMI, available athttps://lawbhoomi.com/grounds-of-control-on-administrative-discretion/(last visited on 10 November 2021).
[7]Jeffrey Lehman and Shirelle Phelps, West’s Encyclopedia Of American Law, 2nd edn 2005.
[8]“Judicial Control and Exercise of Discretion”, available at: https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/judicial-control-and-exercise-of-discretion-constitutional-law-essay.php?vref=1 (Last visited on 12 November 2021).
[9]Grey, J. H., “Discretion in Administrative Law”, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 17.1 (1979) 107-132.
[10]State for Education & Science v. Tameride Metroborough Council [1976] 3 All ER 665.
[11] Ferenc Hörcher, “Universal Morality: Contemporary Socio-Political and Philosophical Stakes, IS A UNIVERSAL MORALITY POSSIBLE?”available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/42941942.pdf (last visited on 12 November 2021).
[12]Leys, Wayne A. R. “Ethics and Administrative Discretion”, Public Administration Review.(Winter 1943)
[13]Rooke’s case A.D. 1598.
[14]Associated Picture House v. Wednesbury Corporation(1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA).
[15]ibid
[16]Council of Civil Service Unions. v. Minister for the Civil Services (1984) 3 All ER 935, pp. 950, 951
[17]“The Exercise of Discretion” (1936) The Police Journal, 9(2), pp. 235–244.
[18]Supra at 16.
[19]19 Pragya Dixit, “Doctrine of Reasonableness in Administrative Law”, Lawbhoomi, available at: https://lawbhoomi.com/doctrine-of-reasonableness-administrative-law/ (last visited on 10 November 2021).
[20]M.P. Jainand S.NJain., Principles Of Administrative Law, 38 (Wadhwa & Company, Nagpur, 2011).
[21] Peter, Fabienne, "Political Legitimacy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/legitimacy/ (last visited on 11 November 2021).
[22] Ajoy P.B, “Administrative Action and the Doctrine of Proportionality in India”, JHSS, Volume 1, Issue 6 (Sep-Oct. 2012), pp 16-23.
[23] Frederick J. De Sloovere, “Contextual Interpretation of Statutes”, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 219 (1936).
[24]Supra at 19.
[25]I.PMassey., Administrative Law, 5th edn., (Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, 2001).
[26]Av Dicey, Law Of The Constitution(Macmillan).
[27]I.PMassey,Administrative Law, 65-66 (2008).
[28]Associated Provincial Pictures Ltd. v Wednesbury Corp., (1948) 1 KB 223.
[29]Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206.
[30]Nakkuda Ali v Jayratne [1951] AC 66.
[31]HCR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law, 181-218 (2000).
[32]The Constitution of India, art. 14.
[33]The Constitution of India, art. 16.
[34]S.PSathe., Administrative Law, 387 (2004).
[35]Supraat 7.
[36]The Constitution of India, art. 19.
[37]Supraat 7.
[38]Supraat 11.
[39]Supra at 34.
[40]Supraat 7.
[41]Ram Krishna v Justice TendulkarAIR 1958 SC 538.
[42]Satwant Singh v Assistant Passport OfficerAIR 1976 SC 1836.
[43]Re The Special Courts Bill(1979) 1 SCC 380.
[44]R Patnakar Rao v Andhra Pradesh(1996) 5 SCC 359.
[45]Accountant General v S Doraiswamy (1981) 4 SCC 93.
[46]Chinta Lingam v India, (19790) 3 SCC 768.
[47]Digambar v Pune Municipal CorporationAIR 1987 Bom. 297.
[48]Supraat 11.
[49]Chintaman Rao v Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118.
[50]Dwarka Prasad v Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 224.
[51]Prabhakar Pandurang v Maharashtra AIR 1966 SC 424.
[52]Madras v V.G. RaoAIR 1952 SC 196.
[53]Raghuvir v. Wards Court AIR 1953 SC 373.
[54]Jagannath v Orissa AIR 1954 SC 400.
[55]Uttar Pradesh v. Dwarka Prasad AIR 1954 SC 224.
[56]M/s Diwan Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. India AIR 1959 SC 626.
[57]Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. v. Union of India8th January 1958.
[58]J.K Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation1991 AIR 1221.
[59]supra at 7.
[60]supra at 11.
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